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Neighborhood Effects 
on AFDC Exits: Examining 
the Social Isolation, Relative 
Deprivation, and Epidemic 
Theories 
Thomas P. Vartanian 
Bryn Mawr College 
Linking data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics with the 1970 and 1980 
censuses, the author finds that, in accordance with the social isolation theory, neigh- 
borhood conditions greatly affect the likelihood of exiting the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Neighborhood conditions are especially 
strong predictors of leaving the program for African Americans, high school drop- 
outs, and for those who marry. Members of each of these groups stay on welfare 
significantly longer when they live in the most economically depressed neighbor- 
hoods or neighborhoods with a relatively high proportion of manufacturing relative 
to professional and executive workers. I test two additional theories of neighborhood 
effects: relative deprivation and epidemic theories. 
There has been considerable debate about the possible negative conse- 
quences of living within poor or "underprivileged" neighborhoods but 
relatively little analysis, mainly because of a lack of data that include 
neighborhood characteristics. I empirically test which of three theories 
on the consequences of living in particular types of neighborhoods- 
the social isolation theory, the relative deprivation theory, or the epi- 
demic theory-holds greater credence in determining the likelihood 
of leaving the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro- 
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gram. I will also clarify the effect of economic conditions and policy- 
relevant variables on AFDC exits. If neighborhood variables are im- 
portant in determining AFDC exit rates, past research that did not 
incorporate these variables may have biased estimates. The results 
from the study will give a better indication of which AFDC recipients 
will be most affected by the recent legislation limiting welfare receipt. 
It may also give policy makers a better idea of where to most effectively 
target job assistance aid to former AFDC recipients or women who 
would previously have qualified for aid. 
Background 
Many of the studies of neighborhood effects on a variety of outcomes 
have been inconclusive or have had conflicting conclusions. Among 
the studies that were inconclusive were analyses that explored the 
likelihood of dropping out of high school and other educational out- 
comes, giving birth as a teenager, drug use, and AFDC receipt.' On the 
one hand, a number of researchers found that living in less advantaged 
neighborhoods had negative, linear effects on educational attain- 
ment.2 On the other hand, several studies found no negative linear 
effects of disadvantaged neighborhoods on educational outcomes but 
did find positive effects for living in advantaged neighborhoods.3 Non- 
linear neighborhood effects have also been found in a number of 
studies on a range of issues, such as dropping out of high school, 
postsecondary education, nonmarital births, and criminal activity.4 
These results have been mixed, perhaps because it is theoretically 
unclear how neighborhoods may affect outcomes. 
Three theories have been developed to explain how neighborhoods 
affect outcomes. In the first theory of neighborhoods, the social isola- 
tion theory, an abundance of "positive" role models and institutions, 
or a lack of "negative" role models and institutions, are thought to 
have a positive effect on outcomes.5 It is unclear whether individual 
outcomes are more affected by negative influences or positive influ- 
ences of neighborhoods. For AFDC recipients, this may mean that 
having a greater percentage of people in the neighborhood working, 
for example, may have a positive effect on the likelihood of finding 
work because of the greater number of possible job contacts. Role 
models may also have a positive effect on work, and thus exit from 
AFDC. Those recipients living in neighborhoods in which many peo- 
ple work may be more inclined toward market-based work than those 
living in neighborhoods in which fewer people work. Just the opposite 
will be true for people living in areas with relatively few people 
working. 
In the second theory, the relative deprivation theory, it is hypothe- 
sized that for some, living in more advantaged neighborhoods may 
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only create a defeatist atmosphere where it appears impossible to 
"catch up" to the relatively high standard of living.' This fatalism 
may force some to give up or drop out. Living in less advantaged 
neighborhoods, conversely, will have the opposite effect, encou- 
raging people to strive to achieve. Hence, AFDC recipients living 
in relatively wealthy neighborhoods may reason that they cannot 
compete with their neighbors and, instead of striving to find work, 
they may decide to continue to receive AFDC for a relatively long 
period of time. 
The third theory, the epidemic theory, is related to the first two 
theories but hypothesizes that the effects of social isolation or relative 
deprivation are nonlinear. Outcomes will only be affected when neigh- 
borhood conditions reach epidemic proportions.' When neighborhood 
conditions get exceptionally good or bad, outcomes will turn positive 
or negative. For example, the neighborhood poverty rate or the level 
of social isolation must reach a very high level before AFDC recipients 
will be affected. Thus, the poverty rate may be an indication of other 
neighborhood problems, such as crime.8 When crime reaches ex- 
tremely high rates, people may be afraid to leave their homes to look 
for work, which, in turn, exacerbates social isolation. In another exam- 
ple, living in a neighborhood in which an above-average number of 
adults are out of work or living in poverty may have no effect on the 
likelihood of an AFDC recipient finding work because role models and 
job contacts, although few, may still be available. However, living in 
a neighborhood in which nearly all of the neighbors of the AFDC 
recipient are unemployed and living in poverty will have an effect 
because it may become difficult to find role models or job contacts. 
Another possibility is that only when conditions within a neighborhood 
are extremely favorable will AFDC recipients respond. For example, 
only when job conditions are extremely favorable are AFDC recipients 
likely to find work because of their relatively low marketability in the 
job market. In other words, the unemployment rate must be extremely 
low for AFDC receipt to be affected. 
Because of these differing theoretical effects of neighborhood condi- 
tions, the consequences of improving disadvantaged neighborhoods 
or of moving relatively deprived residents into more advantaged neigh- 
borhoods is unclear.' It is also theoretically unclear whether the effects 
of neighborhoods will be linear or nonlinear. 
Empirical studies of AFDC recipients are similarly varied. Research 
has shown that some groups, such as women who do not complete 
high school, women with little work experience, and those with young 
children, tend to receive AFDC for a relatively long time.10 Other 
studies on the likelihood of leaving AFDC have found that living 
within large or small cities, suburban areas, or rural areas makes a 
difference in AFDC exit probabilities."11 For example, I found that 
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high school dropouts living in large cities were less likely to exit AFDC 
via increased earnings than were similar high school dropouts living 
in suburban areas.12 This difference is likely due to the number of 
job contacts or jobs within areas of residence. To better target help 
for AFDC recipients, it is important to determine whether it is city 
residence or neighborhood conditions that affect the likelihood of exit 
due to earnings for high school dropouts. 
Neighborhoods may also affect the number of "marriageable" males 
for AFDC recipients.'" If neighborhood conditions make it more diffi- 
cult to find stable jobs because of a lack of job contacts or role models, 
then neighborhoods in which relatively few are working may have few 
marriageable males. William Julius Wilson and others have hypothe- 
sized that a lack of marriageable males within neighborhoods inhibits 
the likelihood of women escaping poverty or leaving the welfare 
system.14 
Because marriage or increased earnings are important routes to 
avoiding welfare, I examine neighborhood effects on these two ways 
of leaving welfare.15 The results of this analysis show that African 
Americans and high school dropouts are especially affected by their 
neighborhood conditions. The neighborhood effects are mostly linear 
and align best with the social isolation theory. Although neighborhood 
conditions are shown to have strong effects on exits from AFDC, 
especially exits due to marriage, these effects do not diminish the 
negative effects of living in large cities on exits due to earnings for 
high school dropouts. 
Data 
The data are derived from linking the Panel Study of Income Dynam- 
ics (PSID) with the 1970 and 1980 U.S. censuses. The PSID is a nation- 
ally representative longitudinal data set and currently contains data 
for the years 1968-92.16 The PSID data for this study cover 1968-86 
because neighborhood data are only available through 1986. 
The neighborhood variables were determined by the "best" neigh- 
borhood data available within the censuses. The "best" neighborhood 
was generally considered to be the smallest possible geographic divi- 
sion with adequate data. In most instances, the best neighborhood 
data were census tract data or census enumeration district data (for 
some untracted areas). If census tract or census enumeration district 
data were unavailable, then either census zip-code data or census mi- 
nor civil division data were used, for whichever area had the smallest 
population above 30 people."7 Also attached to PSID respondent data 
were data on census places (cities). The 1970 census was attached to 
PSID respondents for the years 1968-75; the 1980 data were attached 
to the years 1976-86. Neighborhood data for the sample contain 86 
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percent census tract data, 2.6 percent enumeration district data, 5.7 
percent minor civil division data, and 5.2 percent zip-code data. 
One of the basic concepts used in the analysis is a "spell" on welfare, 
or the number of continuous years that a woman receives AFDC 
income. Spells of AFDC receipt are determined by a process similar 
to that used by Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood.'" For a year to be 
counted as a year on AFDC, the recipient must have an AFDC income 
of at least $250 (1978 dollars), head her own household at the start 
of her spell, and live in a single-family household.19 From 1968 to 
1986, there were a total of 727 spells (or persons) on welfare, 3,413 
spell years on welfare, and 498 AFDC exits.21 Of these AFDC exits, 
108 were due to marriage, 248 exits were due to increased earnings, 
and 142 were exits other than marriage or increased earnings.21 A 
total of 229 spells are right-censored. For a recipient to have a marriage 
exit, she must simultaneously get married and leave AFDC. For a 
recipient to have an earnings exit, she must have earned at least $500 
or worked 300 hours more than in the year prior to exiting AFDC.22 
In determining exit types, marriage took precedence over increased 
earnings, which, in turn, took precedence over other exit types. Hence, 
all exit types are mutually exclusive. 
Method 
In this study, I determine the effects of neighborhood conditions on 
all AFDC recipients. The eight neighborhood variables in this study 
were chosen for both theoretical reasons and in keeping with previous 
research.23 Each neighborhood variable was tested individually be- 
cause of high collinearity and because the variables reflect differing 
explanations of exit likelihood. These neighborhood variables include 
the poverty rate, the percentage of households receiving income from 
public assistance, the percentage of workers in professional and mana- 
gerial professions, the percentage of workers in the manufacturing 
sector, the female employment rate, the female unemployment rate, 
the male employment rate, and the male unemployment rate. 
Three of the variables measure socioeconomic status (poverty rate, 
percentage of households receiving income from public assistance, 
the percentage of workers in professional and managerial professions). 
The social isolation theory would predict that either a low level of 
poverty, a low rate of households receiving public assistance, or a high 
level of workers in high-status professions would be associated with 
short stays on welfare. The female employment and unemployment 
rates are measures of the number of role models and job contacts. 
Again, the social isolation theory would predict that the higher the 
percentage of females working, or the lower the female unemployment 
rate, the shorter the AFDC spell. The male employment and unem- 
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ployment rates are measures of marriage possibilities. The percentage 
working in manufacturing is a measure of relatively low-skilled but 
high-paying jobs in the area, leading to decreased work-search costs 
and increased likelihood of work. 
The eight neighborhood variables were subject to a principal com- 
ponents analysis, with various rotations. Two neighborhood quality 
indexes were extracted. Together, these two neighborhood indexes 
account for 70 percent of the variation of the eight neighborhood 
variables. All of the neighborhood conditions except the percentage 
of employed adults working in the manufacturing sector and the per- 
centage of adults working in professional and executive positions 
loaded highly (absolute values of the loadings were greater than .73) 
onto the first index. The higher this index, the less economically vi- 
brant, or the poorer, is the neighborhood. The second index had 
high loadings for the percentage of employed adults working in the 
manufacturing sector (+.89) and the percentage of adults working in 
professional and executive positions (-.60). The higher the value of 
the second neighborhood index, the higher the percentage of blue- 
collar or manufacturing types of workers in the neighborhood and 
the lower the percentage of white-collar types or professionals and 
executives in the neighborhood. These uncorrelated indexes were used 
together in the hazard rate models. 
Each of the neighborhood variables, including the neighborhood 
quality indexes, were used as both continuous and ordered categorical 
variables.24 The categorical models used percentile scales in hazard 
models to capture nonlinear effects. The percentile intervals were 0-9, 
10-24, 25-49, 50-74, 75-89, and 90-100. The excluded category 
in the model was the "best" neighborhood. For example, if the effects 
of the neighborhood poverty rate were examined, the 0-9 percentile 
group would be the excluded category. 
Each method gives evidence for the different theories being examined. 
For instance, if the continuous model shows that the percentage of house- 
holds receiving income from public assistance in the neighborhood has 
a negative effect on the likelihood of exiting AFDC, there may be greater 
credence in the social isolation hypothesis that neighborhood conditions 
affect AFDC recipients linearly. If the opposite result is found for the 
linear or logarithmic public assistance variable, greater credence may be 
given to the relative deprivation theory. If only living in neighborhoods 
with relatively high proportions of households receiving income from 
public assistance has negative effects on outcomes, then greater credence 
can be given to the epidemic theory of neighborhoods.25 
Several steps were taken to minimize the effects of heterogeneity 
within the models. First, a rich array of family, locational, and economic 
characteristics were used within the model to capture differences 
among groups. Second, groups were examined in separate models. 
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Because previous research has shown that whites and African Ameri- 
cans have different outcomes when living in similar types of neighbor- 
hoods, and because previous research has shown large differences 
in exit probability for women of different educational backgrounds, 
especially for those living in large cities, separate analyses were under- 
taken for differing races and educational levels."26 These separate anal- 
yses allowed the coefficient estimates for the neighborhood character- 
istics to vary for these different groups of AFDC recipients. These 
separate analyses better capture differences among groups.27 
Four sets of variables were used in this study. The variables exam- 
ined arise from previous studies on AFDC exit probabilities and theo- 
ries previously outlined. The technique used in this article follows that 
used by Rebecca Blank and allows the values of many variables to vary 
over the period of the AFDC spell.28 A list of variables, including their 
mean values and standard deviations, is given in table 1. 
One of the sets of variables is location of residence and includes 
three dichotomous variables: large cities (population over 500,000), 
urban areas (population between 250,000 and 500,000), and rural 
areas (places outside of metropolitan areas with populations at or 
under 40,000). The excluded category is suburban areas (population 
in metropolitan areas under 250,000 or outside metropolitan areas 
with populations over 40,000).29 
Dichotomous personal variables include race, the presence of chil- 
dren under age 6, the level of education (high school dropout or 
not), and whether the recipient had ever been married. Continuous 
personal variables include age at the beginning of the AFDC spell, 
the average number of hours of work in the 2 years before entering 
the AFDC program, and the ratio of average income to the poverty 
line in the 3 years prior to AFDC receipt. The effects of owning a car 
were also examined. It is hypothesized that those who own a car 
may be more likely to find jobs for several reasons, including lower 
information costs and greater ability to get to jobs far from their 
residence.30 Dichotomous variables are used to indicate the number 
of years on AFDC to date. 
Control variables for general economic conditions included a dichot- 
omous variable indicating whether the year on AFDC was pre- or 
post-Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA).31 Continuous vari- 
ables for the state maximum AFDC payment for a family of four 
and the county unemployment rate are used for each year of the 
AFDC spell. 
Techniques for Model Estimation 
The dependent variables in this study were the likelihood of exit from 
AFDC via different methods: marriage, increased earnings, and all 
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exits. Multivariate hazard rate analysis using an exponential distribu- 
tion with competing risks was used in order to determine neighbor- 
hood and other effects.32 This technique determines the likelihood of 
exit from AFDC for each year of an AFDC spell.33 The likelihood that 
any individual will use welfare from time 0 to t is f(t, Xt), where Xt is 
a vector of independent variables. If the AFDC spell is right-censored, 
the probability of the censored event is F (T, Xt).34 The hazard rate is 
defined as the instantaneous rate of exiting AFDC at time T = t, 
conditional on receiving AFDC up to time t: 
h(t,Xt) = lim P(t 
< T < (t + At)IT > t, Xt) 
At-.o At 
This technique can then be extended by allowing for different exit 
routes: marriage, increased earnings, and all other exits. 
Results 
All Exits 
The results from the first analysis indicate which particular neighbor- 
hood characteristics make a difference in the likelihood of exiting 
AFDC, via all methods, for different groups of AFDC recipients. Table 
2 shows the hazard rate results for the models using the neighborhood 
indexes as well as the separate neighborhood characteristic models for 
each of the groups examined. (The first three columns in table Al in 
the appendix include the hazard rate regression results for all observa- 
tions for the three exit types.) Table 3 presents the likelihoods of 
exiting AFDC within 2 years via the different methods if the individual 
is either 1 standard deviation above or below the mean of the given 
neighborhood characteristic.35 
For the models using all the AFDC observations in column 5 of 
table 2, as well as the analysis for high school dropouts in column 1, 
the coefficients for both the neighborhood quality indexes are negative 
and highly significant. These findings are in accordance with the social 
isolation hypothesis. The effects of the second neighborhood index 
(indicating the effects of types of jobs) on all AFDC exits are stronger 
for African Americans than the first neighborhood index (which indi- 
cates the overall economic conditions of the neighborhood). This pro- 
vides evidence that, for African Americans, the types of jobs are more 
important than the overall economic conditions of the neighborhoods. 
In contrast, whites are more affected by the overall economic condi- 
tions of the neighborhood than by the types of jobs held by neighbors. 
High school graduates are not affected by either neighborhood vari- 
able index. 
Table 
1 
WEIGHTED 
MEAN 
VALUES 
AND 
STANDARD 
DEVIATIONS 
(in 
Parentheses), 
BY 
EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
AND 
RACE 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Dropouts 
Graduates 
African 
Americans 
Whites 
All 
(N 
= 
2,058) 
(N 
= 
1,353) 
(N 
= 
2,769) 
(N 
= 
529) 
(N 
= 
3,411) 
Variable 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Personal 
variables: 
Average 
hours 
of 
work 
before 
spell 
beginning 
434.0 
(576.7) 
751.7 
(689.2) 
501.3 
(609.2) 
635.1 
(680.2) 
562.8 
(643.7) 
Average 
income 
to 
needs 
before 
spell 
beginning 
1.05 
(.68) 
1.37 
(.83) 
.94 
(.74) 
1.41 
(.73) 
1.16 
(.75) 
Age 
at 
beginning 
of 
spell 
26.38 
(9.11) 
25.38 
(6.90) 
26.36 
(8.94) 
26.19 
(7.92) 
26.15 
(8.37) 
Children 
age 
6 
or 
under, 
dummy 
.61 
(.49) 
.71 
(.45) 
.63 
(. 8) 
.65 
(.48) 
.65 
(.48) 
Number 
of 
children 
2.57 
(1.57) 
2.09 
(1.34) 
2.49 
(1.67) 
2.27 
(1.33) 
2.38 
(1.51) 
Nev  
married, 
dummy 
.41 
(.49) 
.50 
(.50) 
.58 
(.49) 
.31 
(.46) 
.44 
(.50) 
Race 
= 
African 
A erican, 
dummy 
.44 
(.50) 
.52 
(.50) 
.47 
(.50) 
.47 
(.50) 
.47 
(.50) 
Race 
= 
not 
African 
American 
or 
white, 
dummy 
.06 
(.24) 
.03 
(.18) 
.05 
(.22) 
.05 
(.22) 
Car 
ownership, 
dummy 
.37 
(.48) 
.44 
(.50) 
.17 
(.38) 
.62 
(.49) 
.40 
(.49) 
Policy 
and 
economic 
condition 
variables: 
Maximum 
state 
welfare 
payments 
for 
a 
family 
of 
4 
(1967 
dollars) 
180.63 
(67.5) 
187.2 
(69.1) 
167.7 
(72.4) 
194.7 
(61.3) 
183.1 
(68.6) 
County 
unemployment 
rate 
7.66 
(3.16) 
7.40 
(2.98) 
7.40 
(2.98) 
7.59 
(3.25) 
7.55 
(3.10) 
Whether 
year 
was 
pre-OBRA 
.76 
(.42) 
.69 
(.46) 
.72 
(.45) 
.73 
(.44) 
.73 
(.45) 
Locational 
and 
regional 
dummy 
variables: 
La ge 
city 
.28 
(.45) 
.25 
(.43) 
.44 
(.50) 
.08 
(.26) 
.27 
(.44) 
Urban 
area 
.14 
(.35) 
.15 
(.36) 
.19 
(.39) 
.10 
(.30) 
.14 
(.35) 
Suburban 
area 
.41 
(.49) 
.38 
(.49) 
.22 
(.42) 
.57 
(.50) 
.40 
(.49) 
556 
Rural 
area 
.17 
(.38) 
.22 
(.42) 
.15 
(.36) 
.25 
(.43) 
.19 
(.40) 
North 
central 
.38 
(.49) 
.31 
(.46) 
.37 
(.48) 
.38 
(.49) 
.35 
(.48) 
Northeast 
.26 
(.44) 
.22 
(.42) 
.15 
(.35) 
.34 
(.47) 
.25 
(.43) 
South 
.24 
(.43) 
.21 
(.41) 
.36 
(.48) 
.12 
(.33) 
.22 
(.42) 
West 
.12 
(.32) 
.25 
(.44) 
.13 
(.34) 
.16 
(.37) 
.17 
(.38) 
Neighborhood 
variables: 
Poverty 
rate 
23.09 
(14.68) 
20.02 
(14.34) 
29.47 
(15.27) 
13.97 
(8.48) 
21.88 
(14.58) 
Adults 
working 
in 
manufacturing 
(%) 
2 .23 
(11.54) 
26.19 
(11.20) 
26.36 
(11.50) 
30.08 
(11.25) 
2 .03 
(11.50) 
Households 
receiving 
income 
from 
public 
assistance 
(%) 
16.58 
(12.12) 
14.48 
(11.34) 
21.61 
(13.21) 
9.39 
(6.11) 
15.74 
(11.86) 
Adults 
working 
in 
executive 
or 
professional 
oc upations 
(%) 
16.02 
(8.43) 
18.67 
(7.95) 
14.86 
(7.90) 
19.41 
(8.27) 
17.07 
(8.34) 
Employed 
adult 
females 
(%) 
39.30 
(9.19) 
42.82 
(11.02) 
39.48 
(10.21) 
42.03 
(10.03) 
40.70 
(10.10) 
Employed 
adult 
males 
(%) 
62.58 
(12.30) 
64.01 
(1 .94) 
57.66 
(13.28) 
68.40 
(9.68) 
63.15 
( 2.57) 
Unemployed 
adult 
females 
(%) 
10.44 
(6.55) 
8.39 
(5.85) 
11.64 
(7.47) 
7.76 
(4.47) 
9.73 
(6.35) 
Unemployed 
adult 
males 
(%) 
11.04 
(8.35) 
10.04 
(7.88) 
12.80 
(9.93) 
8.73 
(5.66) 
10.64 
(8.18) 
First
neighborhood 
quality 
index 
-.13 
(.92) 
.07 
(.25) 
.07 
(1.01) 
.06 
(.98) 
.08 
(.27) 
Second 
neighborhood 
quality 
index 
.39 
(1.00) 
.05 
(.22) 
-.02 
( .02) 
-.07 
(.91) 
.06 
(.24) 
Time 
on 
welfare 
to 
date, 
dummy 
variables: 
Year 
1 
.20 
(.40) 
.28 
(.45) 
.21 
(.41) 
.25 
(.43) 
.23 
(.42) 
Year 
2 
.16 
(.36) 
.21 
(.41) 
.16 
(.37) 
.19 
(.39) 
.18 
(.38) 
Year 
3 
.13 
(.32) 
.14 
(.35) 
.13 
(.34) 
.12 
(.33) 
.13 
(.34) 
Year 
4 
.10 
(.31) 
.10 
(.30) 
.10 
(.30) 
.10 
(.30) 
.10 
(.31) 
Year 
5 
.08 
(.28) 
.07 
(.25) 
.08 
(.28) 
.10 
(.30) 
.08 
(.27) 
Year 
6 
.06 
(.25) 
.05 
(.25) 
.07 
(.25) 
.07 
(.26) 
.06 
(.24) 
Year 
7+ 
.27 
(.44) 
.15 
(.36) 
.24 
(.43) 
.21 
(.41) 
.22 
(.42) 
NoTE.-Tabulated 
from 
the 
Panel 
Study 
of 
Income 
Dynamics 
Geocode 
Files, 
1968-86. 
OBRA 
= 
Omnibus 
Budget 
Reconciliation 
Act. 
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Table 
2 
HAZARD 
RATE 
RESULTS 
FOR 
THE 
LIKELIHOOD 
OF 
EXITING 
WELFARE 
VIA 
ALL 
METHODS, 
MARRIAGE 
AND 
INCREASED 
EARNINGS, 
1968-86 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Dropouts 
Graduates 
African 
Americans 
Whites 
All 
(N 
= 
2,056) 
(N 
= 
1,353) 
(N 
= 
2,769) 
(N 
= 
528) 
(N 
= 
3,409) 
Neighborhood 
Variables 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
All 
exits: First 
neighborhood 
index 
-.249 
(.085)*** 
-.109 
(.097) 
-.094 
(.058)* 
-.243 
(.144)* 
-.162 
(.062)*** 
Second 
neighborhood 
index 
-.348 
(.066)*** 
-.018 
(.066) 
-.268 
(.051)*** 
.083 
(.135) 
-.171 
(.045)*** 
Poverty 
rate 
-.013 
(.006)*** 
-.003 
(.006) 
-.003 
(.004) 
-.022 
(.015) 
-.008 
(.004)** 
Employed 
in 
manufacturing 
(%) 
-.026 
(.006) ** 
-.001 
(.006) 
-.027 
(.005)*** 
.006 
(.010) 
-.014 
(.004)*** 
Public 
assistance 
(%) 
-.008 
(.007) 
-.003 
(.008) 
-.002 
(.005) 
-.026 
(. 21) 
-.007 
(.005) 
Professionals 
and 
executives 
(%) 
.019 
(.008)*** 
-.008 
(.009) 
.017 
(.006)*** 
-.016 
(.015) 
.007 
(.006) 
Females 
employed 
(%) 
.023 
(.007) ** 
.011 
(.006)* 
.010 
(.005) * 
.019 
(.012) 
.016 
(.005)*** 
M l  
employed 
(%) 
.004 
(.006) 
.007 
(.006) 
. 04 
(.004)
.009 
(.014) 
.006 
(.004) 
F males 
un mployed 
(%) 
-.064 
(.013)*** 
.015 
(.013) 
-.012 
(.009) 
-.047 
(.029)* 
-.024 
(.009)*** 
M les 
unemployed 
(%) 
-.015 
(.009)  
-.022 
(.011)** 
-.010 
(.007) 
-.036 
(.024) 
-.018 
(.007) ** 
Marriage 
exits: 
First 
neighborhood 
index 
-.795 
(.201)*** 
.397 
(.185)** 
-.821 
(.185)*** 
-.098 
(.240) 
-.247 
(.130)* 
Second 
neighborhood 
index 
-.607 
(. 24) ** 
-.182 
(.141)
-.562 
(.115) ** 
-.148 
(.233) 
-.417 
(. 87)*** 
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Poverty 
rate 
-.037 
(.012)*** 
.015 
(.011) 
-.039 
(.010)*** 
-.005 
(.025) 
-.014 
(.008)* 
Employed 
in 
manufacturing 
(%) 
-.046 
(.012) ** 
-.039 
(.013)*** 
-.039 
(. 14) ** 
-.024 
(.018) 
-.042 
(.008)*** 
Public 
assistance 
(%) 
-.050 
(.015) ** 
.014 
(.016) 
-.040 
(.013) ** 
-.052 
(.041) 
-.026 
(.011) ** 
Professionals 
and 
executives 
(%) 
.053 
(.013) ** 
-.029 
(.020) 
.069 
(.012) ** 
-.031 
(.028) 
.017 
(.010)  
Males 
employed 
(%) 
.032 
(.013) ** 
-.023 
(. 13)* 
.050 
(.012) ** 
-.013 
(.022) 
.008 
(. 09) 
Males 
unemployed 
(%) 
-.121 
(.028) ** 
.008 
(.024) 
-.112 
(.026) ** 
-.056 
(.046) 
-.059 
(.017)*** 
Increased 
earnings 
exits: 
First 
neighborhood 
index 
-.140 
(.135) 
-.291 
(.131)** 
.041 
(.077) 
-.778 
(.256)*** 
-.223 
(.092)*** 
Second 
neighborhood 
index 
-.370 
(.113)*** 
.107 
(.086) 
-.247 
(.069)*** 
.318 
(.218) 
-.089 
(.067) 
Poverty 
rate 
-.006 
(.009) 
-.004 
(.008) 
-.007 
(.005) 
-.076 
(.029)*** 
-.009 
(.006) 
Employed 
in 
manufacturing 
(%) 
-.022 
(.009)** 
.011 
(.008) 
-.035 
(.007)** 
.042 
(.016) ** 
.000 
(.006) 
Public 
assistance 
(%) 
.010 
(.010)
-.007 
(.010) 
.004 
(.006) 
-.052 
(.033) 
-.004 
(.007) 
Professionals 
and 
executives 
(%) 
. 18 
(. 13) 
-.001 
(. 11) 
.001 
(.009) 
.009 
(.022) 
.010 
(.008) 
Females 
employed 
(%) 
.025 
(.011)** 
.024 
(.008)*** 
.011 
(.007) 
.036 
(.017)** 
. 23 
(.006)*** 
M l  
employed 
(%) 
-.006 
(.009)
.019 
(.009) * 
-.006 
(.006) 
.048 
(.022)** 
.011 
(.006)
F males 
un mployed 
(%) 
-.058 
(.022)*** 
.004 
(.016)
.002 
(.011) 
-.076 
(.045)* 
-.018 
(.013) 
M l  
unemployed 
(%) 
.006 
(.013) 
-.038 
(.014)*** 
.004 
(.008) 
-.074 
(.037)** 
-.015 
(.010) 
NoTE.--Tabulated 
from 
the 
Panel 
Study 
of 
Income 
Dynamics 
Geocode 
Files, 
1968-86. 
Standard 
errors 
are 
in 
parentheses. 
The 
first 
neighborhood 
index 
relates 
to 
the 
general 
economic 
conditions 
of 
the 
neighborhood, 
such 
as 
the 
poverty 
rate, 
the 
percentage 
of 
people 
on 
public 
assistance, 
and 
the 
employment 
and 
unemployment 
rates. 
The 
higher 
this 
index, 
the 
worse 
the 
economic 
conditions 
of 
the 
neighborhood. 
The 
second 
neighborhood 
index 
refers 
to 
the 
types 
of 
empl yment 
by 
neighborhood 
r idents: 
t  
percentage 
in 
manufacturing 
and 
the 
percentage 
in 
professional 
and 
executive 
positions. 
The 
higher 
this 
index, 
the 
more 
likely 
people 
within 
the 
neighborhood 
are 
working 
in 
manufacturing 
jobs 
and 
th  
less 
likely 
they 
are 
to 
work 
in 
professional 
and 
executive 
jobs. 
Each 
of 
the 
neighborhood 
conditions 
variables, 
xcept 
the 
two 
neighborhood 
i dex 
variables, 
are 
run 
separately 
with 
all 
personal 
characteristics, 
location 
and 
region, 
economic 
conditions, 
and 
policy 
variables 
included 
in 
the 
models. 
The 
two 
neighborhood 
index 
models 
are 
run 
together 
in 
the 
same 
models. 
*p 
< 
.10. 
**p 
< 
.05. 
***p 
< 
.01. 
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Table 
3 
THE 
HAZARD 
OF 
EXITING 
AFDC 
WITHIN 
2 
YEARS 
FOR 
EACH 
NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHARACTERISTIC 
VARIABLE, 
BY 
METHOD 
OF 
EXIT, 
RACE, 
AND 
EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL, 
1968-86 
High 
School 
High 
School 
African 
Dropouts 
Graduates 
Americans 
Whites 
All 
(N 
= 
2,056) 
(N 
= 
1,353) 
(N 
= 
2,769) 
(N 
= 
528) 
(N 
= 
3,409) 
1SD 
1 
SD 
1SD 
1 
SD 
1 
SD 
1 
SD 
1SD 
1 
SD 
1 
SD 
1 
SD 
Below 
Above 
Below 
Above 
Below 
Above 
Below 
Above 
Below 
Above 
Neighborhood 
Variables 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
All 
exits: First 
neighborhood 
index 
42 
28 
49 
51 
33 
27 
53 
36 
44 
34 
Second 
neighborhood 
index 
47 
25 
50 
43 
37 
22 
43 
49 
45 
33 
First
and 
second 
neighborhood 
indexes 
54 
20 
49 
47 
39 
20 
51 
39 
50 
28 
Poverty 
rate 
43 
31 
49 
44 
32 
30 
52 
38 
43 
36 
In 
manufacturing 
(%) 
47 
27 
47 
47 
38 
22 
44 
49 
45 
34 
On 
public 
assistance 
(%) 
39 
33 
49 
43 
31 
30 
50 
39 
42 
36 
In 
professional 
and 
executive 
positions 
(%) 
31 
41 
50 
45 
26 
34 
52 
42 
38 
42 
Female 
employment 
rate 
29 
43 
42 
52 
28 
33 
39 
54 
34 
45 
M l  
employment 
rate 
34 
38 
42 
50 
29 
32 
42 
49 
37 
42 
F male 
unemployment 
rate 
47 
22 
44 
51 
33 
28 
52 
36 
44 
34 
M l  
unemployment 
rate 
40 
32 
52 
39 
33 
28 
52 
36 
44 
33 
Marriage 
exits: 
First 
neighborhood 
index 
21 
6 
9 
18 
9 
2 
15 
14 
14 
9 
Second 
neighborhood 
index 
21 
7 
13 
9 
9 
3 
17 
12 
17 
8 
First
and 
second 
neighborhood 
indexes 
33 
3 
11 
15 
12 
1 
18 
11 
19 
6 
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Poverty 
rate 
22 
8 
10 
16 
9 
3 
15 
15 
14 
10 
In 
manufacturing(%) 
22 
8 
15 
7 
8 
4 
18 
10 
18 
7 
On 
public 
assistance 
(%) 
22 
7 
11 
14 
8 
3 
19 
10 
15 
8 
In 
professional 
and 
executive 
positions 
(%) 
9 
20 
15 
10 
3 
8 
19 
12 
11 
14 
Male 
employment 
rate 
8 
18 
19 
9 
2 
8 
17 
13 
11 
13 
Male 
unemployment 
rate 
25 
3 
11 
13 
11 
1 
18 
10 
17 
7 
Earnings 
exits: 
First 
neighborhood 
index 
13 
11 
32 
20 
14 
16 
38 
9 
21 
14 
Second 
neighborhood 
index 
17 
9 
24 
30 
18 
11 
17 
30 
20 
17 
First
and 
second 
neighborhood 
indexes 
18 
8 
29 
23 
17 
11 
29 
12 
22 
13 
Poverty 
rate 
13 
12 
29 
25 
14 
17 
34 
10 
20 
16 
In 
manufacturing 
(%) 
16 
10 
23 
32 
20 
9 
15 
38 
18 
19 
On 
public 
assistance 
(%) 
10 
15 
30 
23 
14 
16 
28 
15 
19 
17 
In 
professional 
and 
executive 
positions 
(%) 
11 
14 
27 
27 
15 
15 
21 
25 
17 
20 
Female 
employment 
rate 
10 
15 
21 
34 
13 
17 
16 
32 
14 
22 
M l  
employment 
rate 
14 
12 
19 
33 
17 
14 
13 
32 
16 
20 
F male 
unemployment 
rate 
16 
8 
27 
27 
15 
15 
29 
15 
20 
16 
M l  
unemployment 
rate 
12 
14 
33 
19 
14 
16 
30 
13 
20 
16 
NoTE.-Tabulated 
from 
the 
Panel 
Study 
of 
Income 
Dynamics 
Geocode 
Files, 
1968-86. 
The 
values 
in 
the 
table 
indicate 
the 
likelihood 
of 
exiting 
AFDC 
within 
2 
years 
given 
that 
the 
recipient 
is 
1 
SD 
below 
the 
mean 
or 
1 
SD 
above 
the 
mean 
for 
the 
given 
neighborhood 
characteristic 
or 
neighborhood 
index. 
The 
actual 
values 
for 
each 
of 
the 
nonneighborhood 
variables 
in 
the 
models 
are 
multiplied 
by 
their 
respective 
coefficient 
estimate 
in 
determining 
these 
likelihoods. 
Each 
of 
t e 
estimates 
comes 
from 
models 
that 
include 
the 
personal 
variables, 
economic 
and 
policy 
variables, 
the 
locati n 
and 
region 
variables, 
and 
time 
on 
welfare 
variables 
that 
are 
described 
in 
the 
mean 
values 
and 
standard 
deviations 
section 
of 
the 
article. 
Each 
of 
the 
neighborhood 
characteristics 
is 
used 
in 
separate 
hazard 
rate 
models 
except 
the 
first 
and 
second 
neighborhood 
indexes, 
which 
are 
used 
in 
the 
same 
models. 
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Table 3 indicates that the likelihood of exiting AFDC for African 
Americans and high school dropouts is greatly affected by their neigh- 
borhood of residence. For example, living 1 standard deviation below 
the mean relative to 1 standard deviation above the mean for the 
second neighborhood index increases the overall likelihood of AFDC 
exit for high school dropouts by 22 percentage points and for African 
Americans by 15 percentage points. Overall, the likelihood of exiting 
AFDC is improved by 12 percentage points by living in a neighbor- 
hood with a relatively high percentage of white-collar workers com- 
pared with an area with a relatively low percentage of white-collar 
workers. 
Examining the combined effects of the two neighborhood indexes 
shows that high school dropouts living in neighborhoods that are 1 
standard deviation below the mean on both indexes are 34 percentage 
points more likely to exit AFDC in the first 2 years of an AFDC 
spell than high school dropouts in neighborhoods that are 1 standard 
deviation above the mean on both indexes. Overall, there is a 22 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of exiting AFDC within 2 
years when living in neighborhoods that are 1 standard deviation below 
the mean rather than 1 standard deviation above the mean for these 
two neighborhood indexes. 
High school dropouts are affected by six of the eight separate neigh- 
borhood conditions in the all-exits model, supporting the social iso- 
lation hypothesis. African Americans are affected by three of the 
neighborhood variables, high school graduates by two of these 
neighborhood conditions, and whites by only one neighborhood condi- 
tion. The strongest of these effects is the female unemployment rate 
on all exits for high school dropouts. There is a 25 percentage point 
difference between high school dropouts living in low versus high 
female unemployment neighborhoods. 
Marriage Exits 
For marriage exits, table 2 again shows that the coefficients for the 
two neighborhood indexes show strong negative effects for high school 
dropouts and for African Americans. In contrast, the first neighbor- 
hood index has a positive coefficient for high school graduates. In 
other words, in areas in which the neighborhood poverty and unem- 
ployment rates are relatively high, high school graduates are more 
likely to get married and leave welfare. This finding, and the negative 
coefficient for the male employment rate for high school graduates, 
are the only findings that support the relative deprivation theory. Each 
of the separate neighborhood characteristics has strong effects for 
high school dropouts and African Americans, all in the direction of 
the social isolation hypothesis. 
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The strongest effect on marriage exits for both high school gradu- 
ates and African Americans is that of the male unemployment rate. 
Table 3 shows that African Americans living in an area with a relatively 
low male unemployment rate have an 11 percent probability of exiting 
welfare via marriage. This contrasts with a 1 percent probability of 
exiting via marriage for African Americans living in an area with a 
relatively high unemployment rate. For high school dropouts, the 
likelihood falls from 25 percent to 3 percent when comparing a neigh- 
borhood with a low versus a high rate of male unemployment. The 
only variables that negatively affect marriage exits for high school 
graduates are living in areas with relatively high proportions of manu- 
facturing workers and in areas with low male unemployment rates. 
Table 3 shows that there are dramatic differences in marriage exit 
probabilities for high school dropouts, African Americans, and the 
full sample when living 1 standard deviation below the mean for both 
neighborhood indexes. For high school dropouts, the likelihood of 
exit falls from 33 percent to 3 percent when going from 1 standard 
deviation below the mean to 1 standard deviation above the mean for 
the two neighborhood indexes. For African Americans, these likeli- 
hoods fall from 12 percent to 1 percent. 
Increased Earnings Exits 
The increased earnings exit model in table 2 shows that the second 
neighborhood index has negative effects on high school dropouts and 
African Americans, while the first neighborhood index has negative 
effects on high school graduates and whites. The coefficient on the 
first neighborhood index variable is significant for the full sample. 
The differences in likelihoods of exiting AFDC for African Americans, 
high school dropouts, and all sample members living in different types 
of neighborhoods are not as pronounced as in the marriage exit model. 
For example, living in a neighborhood that is 1 standard deviation 
below the mean compared with 1 standard deviation above the mean 
for both of the neighborhood indexes increases by 9 percent points 
(or 69%) the likelihood of exit via earnings by all sample members. 
This difference is 13 percentage points (or over 200%) for the mar- 
riage exit model. Of the separate neighborhood variables, the female 
employment rate has the strongest effect on the likelihood of exiting 
AFDC via increased earnings for the full sample. This, again, supports 
the social isolation hypothesis. 
Nonlinear Effects 
Models were run to check for nonlinear neighborhood effects to deter- 
mine whether epidemic models best explained the effect of neighbor- 
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hoods on the likelihood of welfare exits. The results (not shown) for 
the neighborhood indexes do not indicate any cutoff points at which 
neighborhood conditions dramatically decrease or increase the likeli- 
hood of exiting AFDC for each of the exit types. This indicates that, 
for the overall neighborhood condition variables, little credence can 
be given to the epidemic theory of neighborhoods on AFDC exits.36 
All Exits 
Table 4 shows that some neighborhood conditions do have cutoff 
points at which the likelihood of exit from AFDC, for particular groups 
and for particular exit types, turns dramatically down or up. High 
school dropouts living in neighborhoods in which the female employ- 
ment rate is in the top half of the distribution, rather than the bottom 
half, increases the likelihood of exit by all methods from 16 to 25 
percentage points (or 64% to 132%). Other large and significant cut- 
offs appear in the percentage of neighbors working in the manufactur- 
ing sector. For high school dropouts, African Americans, and all sam- 
ple members, there is a vast difference in the likelihood of exiting 
AFDC for those living in the top 50 percent of areas with adults 
working in the manufacturing sector as opposed to the bottom 50 
percent. Small changes at the midway point in this distribution create 
large changes in the exit probabilities. 
Marriage Exits 
Some marriage exit probabilities are also highly affected by relatively 
small changes in the percentage of neighbors with particular charac- 
teristics at certain points in the distribution. For example, African 
Americans are far more likely to exit AFDC via marriage when they 
live in the top 9 percent of areas in proportion of professionals and 
executives. Moving from the 10-24 percent range to the top 9 percent 
on proportion of professionals and executives increases marriage exit 
probabilities by 8 percentage points (or nearly 100%). The same can 
be said for high school dropouts moving from the bottom 50 percent 
to the top 50 percent in proportion of professionals and executives. 
Even more profound for African Americans, and quite dramatic for 
high school dropouts, are the nonlinear effects of the male unemploy- 
ment rate on marriage exits. When living in neighborhoods in which 
the male unemployment rate is in the bottom 75 percent relative 
to the top 25 percent, African-American marriage exit probabilities 
increase from 1-4 percent to 15-22 percent. 
The neighborhood poverty rate has similar dramatic, nonlinear ef- 
fects for marriage exit probabilities for African Americans and high 
school dropouts. For high school dropouts, living in neighborhoods 
in the bottom quartile of the poverty rate increases the likelihood of 
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exit by at least 12 percentage points (or over 100%) compared with 
the middle 50 percent of neighborhoods. For African Americans, go- 
ing from the bottom half of poverty areas to the top half increases 
marriage exit probabilities by at least 11 percentage points (or by over 
100%). The percentage of people in the manufacturing sector also 
has dramatic cutoff points in marriage exit probabilities for high school 
dropouts and all sample members. For high school dropouts, living 
in areas in the top 50 percent decreases the likelihood of a marriage 
exit by at least 50 percent over those living in the bottom 50 percent. 
Increased Earnings Exits 
In the earnings exit models, two of the groups are dramatically affected 
by certain small changes at particular points in the distributions of 
two of the neighborhood characteristics examined. For whites, living in 
areas in which the percentage of adults working in the manufacturing 
sector is in the lowest 25th percentile decreases the likelihood of an 
earnings exit by at least 22 percentage points (or at least 85%). For 
high school graduates, living in areas in which the female employment 
rate is in the bottom 9 percent decreases earnings exit probabilities 
by at least 25 percentage points (or at least 85%). 
These results indicate that relatively small changes in some neigh- 
borhood characteristics at particular points in their distributions can 
have large effects on exit probabilities for some groups. Of the 50 
models run for all AFDC exits (10 variables by five groups), only four 
of these models showed signs of epidemic effects. Likewise, for the 
marriage exit and increased earnings exit models, only nine and two 
of the 50 models, respectively, showed signs of epidemic effects. Thus, 
while the results show some evidence for epidemic models, it is the 
linear, social isolation models that show strong and far more consistent 
effects on AFDC exit probabilities. 
Large Cities, Neighborhoods, and Earnings Exits 
I have previously shown that living in large cities has a negative effect 
on exit due to earnings for high school dropouts." This may be be- 
cause of the differences in neighborhood conditions within large cities 
relative to other areas, not solely because of a large-city residence. To 
test for this, earnings exit models were run for high school dropouts 
with each of the different neighborhood characteristics. 
When different neighborhood conditions were controlled in each 
of the models examined, none of the controls had a significant effect 
on the large-city coefficient. In fact, all of the models show that the 
large-city effect is highly significant.38 (The model with the two neigh- 
borhood indexes is shown in the appendix, table Al, col. 4.) In other 
Table 
4 
PROBABILITIES 
OF 
AFDC 
EXIT 
WITHIN 
2 
YEARS 
OF 
AFDC 
RECEIPT 
FOR 
GIVEN 
GROUPS 
WITH 
PARTICULAR 
NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHARACTERISTICS, 
1968-86 
High 
School 
High 
School 
African 
Dropouts 
Graduates 
Americans 
Whites 
All 
All 
exits: Female 
employment 
rate: 
lowest 
90th-100th 
percentile: 
19 
75th-89th 
percentile 
25 
50th-74th 
percentile 
19 
25 -49th 
percentile 
42 
10th-24th 
perc ntile 
41 
0th-9th 
percentile 
44 
Manufacturing 
workers: 
highest 
90th-100th 
percentile: 
46 
36 
48 
75th-89th 
percentile 
65 
44 
44 
50th-74th 
percentile 
42 
43 
49 
25 -49th 
p rcentile 
29 
20 
31 
10th-24th 
p rcentile 
25 
21 
36 
0th-9  
percentile 
16 
18 
30 
Marriage 
exits: 
Poverty 
rate: 
highest 
90th-100th 
percentile: 
7 
2 
75th-89th 
percentile 
6 
4 
50th-74th 
percentile 
13 
3 
25 -49th 
percentile 
12 
9 
10t -24th 
p rcentile 
29 
10 
0th-9t  
percentile 
25 
9 
Male 
unemployment 
rate: 
highest 
90th- 
100th 
percentile: 
3 
1 
75th-89th 
p rcentile 
4 
3 
50th-74th 
percentile 
11 
4 
566 
25th-49th 
percentile 
14 
2 2 
10th-24th 
percentile 
30 
2 22 
Oth-9th 
percentile 
22 
15 
Professionals 
and 
executives: 
highest 
90th-100th 
percentile: 
9 
1 
- 
1 
75th-89th 
p rcentile 
5 
 
50th-74th 
percentile 
12 
4 
25 -49th 
percentile 
23 
7 
10 -24th 
p rcentile 
21 
9 9 
Oth-9th 
percentile 
29 
17 
Manufacturing 
workers: 
lowest 
90th-100th 
percentile: 
33 
32 
75th-89th 
percentile 
20 
50th-74th 
p rcentile 
14 
11 
25th-49th 
p rcentile 
7 
9 
10t -24th 
percentile 
7 
9 
Oth-9th 
percentile 
7 
4 
Earnings 
exits: 
Female 
employment 
rate: 
lowest 
90th-100th 
percentile: 
4 
75th-89th 
percentile 
29 
50th-74th 
p rcentile 
44 
25th-49th 
p rcentile 
38 
10t -24th 
percentile 
36 
O -9th 
percentile 
26 
Manufacturing 
workers: 
lowest 
90th-100th 
percentile: 
4 
75th-89th 
percentile 
3 
50th-74th 
percentile 
33 
25th-49th 
p rcentile 
31 
10t -24th 
p rcentile 
26 
Ot -9th 
percentile 
39 
NoTE.--Tabulated 
from 
the 
Panel 
Study 
of 
Income 
Dynamics, 
1968-86. 
Only 
variables 
that 
showed 
signs 
of 
the 
epidemic 
theory 
were 
tabulated. 
567 
568 Social Service Review 
words, it is not because of the condition of large-city neighborhoods 
that high school dropouts are less likely to earn their way off AFDC. 
The loss of manufacturing, retail, and wholesale jobs within large cities 
helps to explain why exiting welfare via increased earnings may be 
more difficult for low-skilled AFDC recipients living in the largest 
U.S. cities. 
Conclusion 
This study has examined the effects of neighborhood conditions on 
AFDC exit probabilities, testing which of three theories best explains 
why some stay on AFDC a relatively long time. The evidence lends 
support to the social isolation theory and finds some support for the 
epidemic theory of neighborhoods, especially for specific groups of 
AFDC recipients. The only sign of the relative deprivation theory 
was found for high school graduates, who were more likely to marry 
and leave AFDC when living in more, rather than less, economically 
distressed neighborhoods. For high school dropouts and African- 
American AFDC recipients, the effects of neighborhoods are strong 
and consistent. Members of each of these groups stay on welfare sig- 
nificantly longer when they live in the most economically depressed 
neighborhoods or neighborhoods with a relatively high proportion of 
manufacturing workers relative to professionals and executive work- 
ers. The effect of neighborhoods on exits due to marriage was espe- 
cially strong for African Americans and high school dropouts. The 
strongest neighborhood variable in these models for both groups was 
the male unemployment rate, which gives credence to Wilson's "mar- 
riageable male" hypothesis. Whites and high school graduates are not 
nearly as affected by their neighborhood conditions as are African 
Americans and high school dropouts, but they still have decreased 
probabilities of exiting due to earnings when living in economically 
depressed neighborhoods. 
Neighborhood characteristics, however, did not eliminate the strong 
negative effects for high school dropouts of living within large cities. 
Entering neighborhood variables into the model did not dramatically 
change the coefficient estimates for other policy-relevant variables, 
such as the coefficient for the state maximum welfare payment or the 
coefficient for years before or after the OBRA tax changes. 
Increasing AFDC exit probabilities for high school dropouts or Afri- 
can Americans will involve either improving neighborhood conditions 
or allowing AFDC recipients to move from area conditions that lower 
the likelihood of leaving AFDC relative to other types of areas. The 
Gautreaux experiment in Chicago has shown that moving residents 
out of particularly bad areas can increase the likelihood of work."9 
These types of experiments should be undertaken to better understand 
how neighborhoods affect work and AFDC outcomes. 
Appendix Table 
Al 
RESULTS 
FOR 
HAZARD 
RATE 
MODELS 
FOR 
THE 
LIKELIHOOD 
OF 
EXITING 
WELFARE, 
FOR 
ALL 
OBSERVATIONS 
AND 
FOR 
HIGH 
SCHOOL 
DROPOUTS, 
1968-86 
Marriage 
Exits: 
Earnings 
Exits: 
All 
Exits: 
Earnings 
Exit: 
All 
Observations 
All 
Observations 
All 
Observations 
High 
School 
Dropouts 
Variable 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Intercept 
-.879 
(.783) 
- 
1.772 
(.555)*** 
-.921 
(.392)** 
-3.004 
(.914)*** 
Personal 
variables: 
Average 
hours 
of 
market 
work 
2 
years 
before 
spell 
*.001 
.002 
(.001) 
.004 
(.0001)*** 
.002 
(.001)*** 
.002 
(.002) 
Average 
income 
to 
poverty 
line, 
3 
years 
before 
spell 
. 12 
(. 11)* 
.092 
(. 81) 
.039 
(.061) 
.316 
(.169)* 
High 
school 
dropout 
-.018 
(. 87) 
-.625 
(. 42)*** 
-.372 
(.097)*** 
Age 
at 
beginning 
of 
spell 
-.062 
(.015)*** 
-.005 
(.010) 
.008 
(.006) 
.029 
(.013)** 
Whether 
child 
age 
6 
or 
less 
-.782 
(.201) ** 
.246 
(.157) 
-.047 
(.106) 
.076 
(.243) 
Number 
of 
children 
.030 
(.065) 
-.075 
(.046)* 
-.109 
(.032)*** 
-.002 
(.065) 
N v  
married 
-.737 
(.203)*** 
-. 23 
(.154)*** 
-.634 
(.109) ** 
-.127 
(.280) 
Race 
of 
black 
-.558 
(.229) ** 
.483 
(.170) ** 
-.074 
(.118) 
.417 
(.302) 
Races 
other 
than 
black 
or 
white 
1.027 
(.287) ** 
-.010 
(.399) 
.387 
(.210) 
1.049 
(.569)* 
Car 
ownership 
-.298 
(.187) 
.143 
(.150) 
-.043 
(.102) 
.043 
(.245) 
Policy 
and 
economic 
conditions 
variables: 
Maximum 
state 
welfare 
payment 
*.01 
.003 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.0004 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.002) 
County 
unemployment 
rat  
-.079 
(.031)*** 
-.059 
(.022)*** 
-. 7 
(.016)*** 
-.100 
(.038)*** 
Whether 
year 
was 
pre-OBRA 
-.598 
(.222) ** 
-.074 
(.176) 
-.100 
(.123) 
-.146 
(.289) 
(Table 
continues 
on 
next 
page.) 
Table 
Al 
(Continued) 
Marriage 
Exits: 
Earnings 
Exits: 
All 
Exits: 
Earnings 
Exit: 
All 
Observations 
All 
Observations 
All 
Observations 
High 
School 
Dropouts 
Variable 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Location 
and 
region 
dummy 
variables: 
South 
.878 
(.353)*** 
.056 
(.259) 
.365 
(.181) 
.153 
(.494) 
North 
central 
.380 
(.249) 
.319 
(.178)* 
.199 
(. 24) 
.703 
(.305)** 
West 
.546 
(.243)** 
.296 
(.202) 
.142 
(.135) 
.169 
(. 07) 
Large 
city 
-.471 
(.247)* 
-.373 
(.198)* 
-.200 
(.131) 
-1.407 
(.350)*** 
Urban 
area 
-.121 
(.246) 
-. 47 
(.220) 
-. 57 
(. 40) 
-.903 
(.394) * 
Rural 
area 
.009 
(.249) 
.548 
(.170)*** 
.195 
(.124) 
.394 
(.276) 
Neighborhood 
variables: 
First 
neighborhood 
index 
-.247 
(.130)* 
-.223 
(.092)*** 
-.162 
(.062)*** 
.027 
(.133) 
Second 
neighborhood 
index 
-.417 
(. 87)*** 
-.089 
(.067) 
-.171 
(.045) ** 
.320 
(.121)*** 
Time 
on 
welfare 
to 
date 
dummy 
variables: 
Year 
2 
.701 
(.225)*** 
-.181 
(.172) 
.027 
(.118) 
-.279 
(.299) 
Year 
3 
.515 
(.257) * 
-.393 
(. 14)* 
-.242 
(.146) 
- 
1.224 
(.470)*** 
Year 
4 
.622 
(.270)** 
-.004 
(.215) 
.038 
(.150) 
-.795 
(.414)  
Year 
5 
- 
.074 
(.367) 
.203 
(.225) 
- 
.109 
(.177) 
.402 
(.311) 
Year 
6 
-.187 
(.432) 
.126 
(.261) 
-.126 
(.202) 
-.361 
(.432) 
Year 
7+ 
-.563 
(.339)* 
-.248 
(.219) 
-.161 
(.149) 
-. 58 
(. 98) 
Log 
likelihood 
for: 
Marriage 
exits 
for 
all 
observations 
- 
688.90 
Earnings 
exits 
for 
all 
observations 
- 
1,074.43 
All 
exits 
for 
all 
observations 
-1,855.84 
Earnings 
exits 
for 
high 
school 
dropouts 
- 54.40 
NoTE.--Tabulated 
from 
the 
Panel 
Study 
of 
Income 
Dynamics 
Geocode 
Files, 
1968-86. 
OBRA 
= 
Omnibus 
Budget 
Reconciliation 
Act. 
Standard 
errors 
are 
in 
parentheses. 
*p 
< 
.10. 
** 
p 
< 
.05. 
***p 
< 
.01. 
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